digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

2017

A Practical Companion to the Constitution: The
Cumulative Supplement 2nd Series 2008-2017
Jethro K. Lieberman
New York Law School, jethro.lieberman@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_books
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lieberman, Jethro K., "A Practical Companion to the Constitution: The Cumulative Supplement 2nd Series 2008-2017" (2017).
Books. 40.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_books/40

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Books by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Books

7he

Cumulative
SUPPLEMENT
second series

2008-2017

to
A PRACTICAL COMPANION
TO THE CONSTITUTION
HOW THE SUPREME COURT
HAS RULE[) ON ISSUES FROM
ABORTION TO ZONING

Jethro K. Lieberman

NE\N Vt'1RK
D 1AL0 Gu E r REs s
201

7

LAW SCHc·;.r)~L
\..

Contents
About this Book

VII

Additions to the Main Volume

Topics, 2008-2016
'IL1pics, 2m6-.w17 Term ofCourr

2J>5

'fable of All Cases, 2008-2017

Index of Subjects and Names

247

Index of Previous Cases

Copyright le)

2017

by Jethro K. Lieberman

Dialogue Press
6008 Sonoma Road

lkthesda, MD 20817

All rights reserver/.
ISBN 978+943827-02-2
Composcd in lnDesign CC

2017

Caramond Premier Pro 10.5/12.5, c;jJ] Sans, and Trajan Pro
Printed in rhe United States ofAmcrict
at Lightning Source, Inc.
LiVcrgne, Tenncssec
First Edition

v

About this Book

First published in 1992, Jht !:'1'otvingCrmstit11tim1 (Random House), the prcdeceN>rvolume to,/ Pmctim/ Cm1tJMnirm to tfw Cowtitulion, covered the comtirntional cases in the United States Suprell\e Court
through the 1991-1992 term. The original hardcover edition was supplemented in three volumes through
the 199)-1996 term.
Ca.,es from the rim:<.: supplements and the ( :ourt's later terms were incorporatnl in,-/ l'1;n/ic,z/ C{m;prmion to the Comtilution: f!rl//' the Sup/'C1111· Crmrl ff,H Ruled 011 lswts/im11 .-1/mrtion lo /.m1i11,( (University of California Press, 1999 ), which is current through the 1997-1998 term.
Tl:n non-cumulative annual supplements, covering ten Court terms beginning with the 1998 'krm,
Were published by Dialogue Press, and these were acecunmlated, rearranged, and edited for continuity
(with minor errors corrected) in a single volume, '/he I )nmnial S11pplc111ml, in January, 2009. 1he /)f·Ctnni,i/ S11pp/ei11mt covers in more than 200 topical essays the ·190 constitutional cases decided by
the Snprell\e Court after the publication of the revised main volume, from Ocrober 1998 through
June 20 o 8.
'!his is the ninth supplement ofthe second (cumulative) series, covering the 008 constitutional and ljuasi-constitutional c1scs of the Court's terms, from the 2008-2009 term through the
2016-2017 term, and noting the retirements of Associate Justices ])avid H. Souter and John P~1ul
Stevens, the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and the appoinrments of Associate Justices So11ia
Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Neal ?vl. ( ;orsuch. For production reasons this year, decisiom of the
Court during its 2016-2017 term arc discussed in a separate st:etion following the topical discussion of cases decided from October 2008 throughJunc 2016.
'I11a11ks to Katherine Georges for help with design and production and to Jo Shifrin frir assistance on the Table of Ca;,es and Index.
For further informatio11, contact me at jethro.lidx:rnian(~[>nyls.cdu.

Jethro J<. l.ichcnwm
Labor Day, 2017
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Topics

2008-2016

lhis section contt1ins all topics 11l'ising/im11 Ci/Sts r/ccirlu/ thro11,r;h the 2015-:w16 /a111. For topio 1irisinJ!../f"11111 c11s1'S decided durin,r; th!' .?.016-2017 tcrw, sa the sttlirm hrgiw1i11g alp. 20).

In 2016, in its first decision in
nearly a quarter ccmury to confront the core of
abortion rights, the Court held 5- 0 in lYho/c
TV1n111m'.1· 11mlth u. !Iclltnttrlt that Texas imposed unconstitutionally undue burdens on the
exercise of the right to abortion when it subjected abortion clinics and doctors to two regulations that would have forced many clinic,
throughout the state to close. 'lhe firs~ n::gulation, the "admitting-privilcgc.s rcquin:rncnt,"
mandated physicians have admissions privileges
at a hospital within
milts of any clinic in
which he or she performs abortions. The second, or "surgical-center n.:qu irement," d irened
every abortion clinic to meet the minimum
standards for ambubtory surgical centers. In a
suit to enjoin enforcement of the admitting
privileges requirement at two clinics and to bar
enforcement of the surgical-center requirement
statewide, a federal district court fimnd that the
requirements, taken together, would lead to
the closing of almost all abortion clinics in
Texas." Among its findings: the number of clinics, 40 before the Texas ]a,~' was enacted, dropped
statewide by nearly half "in the wake ofenforcetnem of the admitting-privileges requirement."
More would close should the surgical-center requirement take effect, leaving the entire state
With no more than eight clinics, and probably
only seven. They would be located in only friur
metropolitan areas-Houston, Austin, San
Antonio, and Dallas-Fort Worth-and would
leave "a particularly high barrier tCir poor, rural,
or disadvamaged women"; more than two million women ofreproducrivc age.: would live more

ABORTION

,o

than 50 miles from J clinic :rnd some ...,50,000
would live more rlun 200 miles away. '!he intended purpose of the regulations-to make
women safrr-was a fiction: the data showed
that the women had better mcdicd outcomes in
the pre-cnactmcm clinics "than many common
medical procedures not subject to such intense
regulation," and, tellingly, ri6 of the++' licensed
ambu larory smgical centers, bur nor abortion
clinics, h,1d received waivers against .surgical-center requirements. J\!loreover, the clinics' cost of
compliance would be "signillcam," in the range
of $1 million to $1.5 million each. 'lhe district
court struck down the laws as creating a constitutionally "impermissible obstacle" to obtaining an abortion. '111C Fifi:h Circuit court of appeals reversed, holding among other things that
the two "lexas requirements "were rationally related to a legitimate srate interest": "rais[ing] the
standard and quality ofcare for women seeking
abortions and ... protect[ig] the health and welfare of women seeking abortiom"; and that the
district court irnpcrmissibly substituted its judgment about the legislation's effects for that ofrhe
Texas legislature.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Stephen
Breyer reversed. Under the principal precedent,
PLnmcd P1l1'mthoorl o/So11thm.1tnn Pmmy/.l'dnitI u. Cm:y (1992), courts must consider both
the benefits and burdens of the abortion law in
question and must review under a much stricter
standard than "rational basis": they must consider whether a burden is "undue." Nor should
courts defer to legislatures on the meaning and
weight of the evidence. Judges must sifi: the evi-
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ABORTION

dcncc and weigh "the asserted benefits against
the burdens." On inspection, <>aid Justice Breyer,
the first requirement, admitting privikges, was
said to benefit women by ensuring that they
"have easy access to a hospital -;hould complications arise." Bm in fact "it brought about no
such health-related benefit." Rather, "there was
no significant health-related problem that the
new law helped to cure." Studies showed that
rhe complication rate in first-trimester abortions is kss than one-quarter of one percent,
and even these "rarely n::quire hospital admis-;ion, much less immediate transfer to a hospital
from an outpatient clinic." Most abortion patients who develop complications do so days
after surgery, not while they are in the clinic.
"When asked directly at oral argument whether
Texas knew of a single instance in which the
new requirement would have helped even one
woman obtain better treatment, Texas admitted that there was no evidence in the record of
such a case." Not only would the new requirement not help, it would place a "subsrantial obstacle in the path ofa woman's choice." Half the
'kxas facilities offering abortions closed in the
months before the ad1nirting-privileges reqnirenH.:nt rook effect. Nineteen abortion di nics
closed by the effective date of the regulation.
Moreover, admitting privileges are not necessarily (or not at all) based on skill of the doctor;
"hospitals often condition admitting privileges
on" the patients they bring in. Bur abortion
physicians did nor bring in patients: in the previous decade in the El Paso area, for example, of
the 17,000 abortions performed, not a single
patient needed to be transferred to a hospital for
emergency treatment. One doctor, who had delivered 15,000 babies over his 38-year career,
"was unable to get admitting privileges at any of
the seven hospitals within 30 miles of his clinic,"
for reasons having nothing to do with his competence. As Justice Breyer summed up: "The admitting-privilege, requirement does not serve
any relevant credentialing function."
'I11e surgical-center requirement fared no better. For one thing, requiring clinics and other
facilities to "upgrade" ro various spatial, plumbing, hearing, and mirsing standards would nor
likely benefit patients because complications for
most patients, such a'> those cm medications,

come after rh<.:ir discharge from the facility. 'The
evidence suggested "that abortions taking place
in an abortion facility are safe-indeed, safer
than numerous procedures that take place outside hospitals and to which Texas does not apply
its surgical-center requirement." For example,
"nationwide, childbirth is 14 rimes more likely
than abortion to result in death, but 'frxas law
allows a midwife to oversee child-birth in the
patient's own home. Colonoscopy, a procedure
that typically takes place outside a hospital (or
surgical center) setting, has a mortality rate 10
times higher than an abortion." Mor<.:over, the
surgical-center requin:ment does not even apply
to about two-thirds of rhe state's surgical centers: Texas waives the requirement for them bur
not for any abortion facilities. Like its companion regulation, the surgical-center n:quirement
would force more clinics to close." In the face of
no threat to women's health, Texas sn:ks to force
women to travel long distances to get abortions
in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients
seeking these services arc less likely to get the
kind of individualized attention, serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors
at less taxed facilities may have offered."
In summary, the two 'Iexas reqtliremenrs were
both constitutionally overinclusive and underinclusive: overinclusive because they would provide
no additional health benefits while reducing the
women's access to abortion facilities; underinclusive because they did nor apply to medical
facilities and situations in which they might
provide a benefit bur were imposed instead only
on abortion facilities in which they were not
needed. 1hc Conrt struck down both regulations on their face.
Texas argued that under the law's severability
clause a court's invalidation of any one application of the requirements ought not invalidate
any other possible application, and hence the
law itself bars a ruling that the law is facially invalid . .Justice Breyer rejected the argument; a
severability clause so interpreted would force
courts to perform legislative work, picking and
choosing the rules that would apply to any particular conduct. Doing so "would inflict enormous costs on both courts and litigants, who
would be reqtlin:d to proceed in this manner
whenever a single application of a law might be

valid." If a law with such a severability clause
s;ud (this is not Justice Breyer's exampk) "it
shall be unlawful to act wrongfully," the Texas
;:rgument would preclude striking it down as
facially invalid and would require the courts,
rnstead, to examine each use, rcv..:rsino a convic.
.
0
tion for singing too cheerfully on the sidewalk
and upholding it (perhaps) when appli.:d to
murder. The Court declined "Texas' invitation
to pave the way for legislatures to immunize
their statures from facial review."
ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
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Bnr in this case a local carrier sought to impose
"intrastate access charges fiir tdcphone calls
transported via the Internet" on a national carrier.
None of the cirrnmstances of rhis case fir within
the "exceptional circumstances" of Ymmga noted
above. 'I hose three cirrnmsranu::s "define Yo11n,~c
n-'s scope," the Court said.
.\'('{' r1f.-r1: I>ISUJ/ Tiff IN C'R/,HIN.-11, i'l/IJCU f)JNUS.
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Pmet!!, the Court adhered

to the presulllption
it annmmced in 1\lirhigt111 1>. /,011L~ (198>) that
when a state court decision "appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with
the federal law," unlcs-; it is "clear from the face
of the opinion" tlut it rests on an adequate and
independent stare ground, the Court will assume that the state court decided as it did "because ir believed that federal law required it to
do so." In raising the question of whether the Mi1m1d11 rules must be expressed in particular language, the state supreme court "trained on what
i\Jimnrlz demands, rather than on what [stare 1
law indeprndenrly requires." Said Justice Rurh
Bader Ginsburg, "We then:frire cannot identify,
'from the face of the opinion,' a clear statement
that the decision rested on a state ground separate
from i\limnd.z." She noted rhar the state suprellle
court remains fr..:e to impose "any ~1ddirional protections against coerced confessions it deem-; appropriate" under the _-;tatc constitution, but because its decision did not indicate "clearlv and
expressly" that it "was based on bona fide sq1arate, adequate, and independent [state] grounds,"
the Court has jurisdiction to decide the question.
[For details, see SELF-INCRIMINATION.]
In Cone u. Rell, a murder defendant's third
appeal to the Supreme Court (for the earlier
cases, see Bell u. Cone (2.002) and (2.005)), the
Court held that a defendant is nor procedurally
barred from raising a federal claim in a frderal
habeas appeal merely because a state court asserts
that a procedural ruk: bars it from considering the
claim. Federal courts may go behind the state's
conclusion to determine whether the state's rdiance on a procedural default rule is genuine. In this
case, the state courts insisted that the ddendant
had either twice presented (or, contradictorily,
waived) a claim that he had been denied Rmtly
material that might tend to exrnlpatc him. In fact,
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